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PUBLIC UTILITIES - DUE PROCESS - VALIDITY OF ORDER REDUCING
INTRASTATE TELEPHONE RATES TO CONFORM TO INTERSTATE RATES - The
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, by order of March 15, 1938, required appellant, the Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, to reduce its
intrastate toll rates for distances exceeding thirty-six miles so as to conform to
rates charged by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company for comparable distances for interstate services. After full hearing the commission based
its order upon .findings that the interstate American Company offered at substantially lower rates the very same service, with identical facilities, accorded
by its intrastate subsidiary, plus the additional service furnished by a connecting
company, and that hence the higher intrastate rates constituted an unreasonable
discrimination against intrastate patrons in violation of section 304 of the
Public Utility Law of Pennsylvania. 1 On appeal, the superior court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order. 2 Appellant based its appeal to the United States
Supreme Court upon three propositions: ( 1) that the commission's order was

1 Pa. Pub. Laws (1937), p. 1053, Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1939), tit. 66, §
l 144: "No public utility shall, as to rates, make or grant any unreasonable preference
or advantage to any person, corporation, or municipal corporation, or subject any person, corporation, or municipal corporation to any unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage,
No public utility shall establish or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates,
either as between localities or as between classes of service."
2 135 Pa. Super. 218, 5 A. (2d) 410 (1939).
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wholly without support in the evidence and hence constituted a denial of due
process; (2) that the order, based upon discrimination only, prescribed rates
not found to be reasonable and as such was arbitrary and hence a denial of due
process; and (3) that the order through regulation of interstate rates imposed
a direct burden upon interstate commerce. Held, per curiam, that none of
appellant's three contentions, where confiscation was expressly disclaimed, presented a substantial federal question., Appeal dismissed. Bell Telephone Co. of
Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, (U. S. 1940) 60

S. Ct. 411.
Appellant's first contention strikes at the roots of procedural due process.
The concept of a fair hearing in rate proceedings features the duty of the commission to base its orders upon substantial supporting evidence.3 Assuming for
the moment the soundness of the significant interstate-rate criterion adopted by
the court in the principal case for testing the reasonableness of intrastate rates,
an examination of the evidence introduced by the commission to fortify its
finding of unreasonable discrimination would seem to render such finding
unassailable. 4 Hence, appellant's procedural argument melts ultimately into
its second and key contention that the order is purely arbitrary and hence
violates substantive due process. 5 Inasmuch as appellant expressly disclaimed raising the question of confiscation,6 the due process issue hinges on whether the
commission acted in an arbitrary or capricious way.7 Ignoring the various for3 "The provision for a hearing implies both the privilege of introducing evidence
and the duty of deciding in accordance with it. To refuse to consider evidence introduced or to make an essential finding without supporting evidence is arbitrary action."
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United States (The Chicago Junction Case), 264 U. S.
258 at 265, 44 S. Ct. 317 (1924). See Berkson, "Due Process Requirements of a
Fair Hearing in a Rate Proceeding," 38 CoL. L. REv. 978 (1938), to the effect
that the result reached, where there is a lack of substantial evidence in support thereof,
will be invalid for want of compliance with the statutory procedural requirements of
due process. Accord: St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38,
56 S. Ct. 720 (1936).
4 See the table of comparison of three-minute initial period station-to-station
intrastate toll rates with rates for interstate messages of comparable distances in the
superior court opinion of the principal case. 135 Pa. Super. 218 at 226.
5 " • • • when parties have been fully heard in the regular course of judicial proceedings an erroneous decision of the state court does not deprive the unsuccessful
party of his property without due process of law•.•." Bonner v. Gorman, 213 U. S.
86 at 91, 29 S. Ct. 483 (1909). See also American Railway Express Co. v. Kentucky,
273 U. S. 269 at 273, 47 S. Ct. 353 (1927); McDonald v. Oregon R. R. & Nav.
Co., 233 U. S. 665, 34 S. Ct. 772 (1914).
6 Had the question of confiscation been raised, the commission would undoubtedly
have entered into a valuation of appellant's property. But waiver of that question does
not foreclose other due process arguments, or questions of statutory construction. In
St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461 at 488, 49 S. Ct. 384
( 1929), absence of confiscation was held to be immaterial, since "Whether the Commission acted as directed by Congress was the fundamental question presented."
7 The Pennsylvania legislature has spoken thus: ''Whenever the commission, after
reasonable notice and hearing, upon its own motion or upon complaint, finds that the
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mulae heretofore evolved for the purpose of setting rates intrinsically reasonable, 8 the commission placed appellant's rates side by side with those exacted
for interstate telephone service, and, in execution of the presumption that the
latter rates were fair and reasonable, leveled the intrastate rates to ·conform with
them. Thus, in sustaining the order of the commission, the court subscribes to the
presumption of reasonableness of the interstate rates, and then concludes that
this presumption encompasses the intrastate rates because of identity of facilities. 9
Appellant avers that this method of rate-fixing is unconstitutionally arbitrary.
Upon the facts of this particular case, appellant's theory has little merit. Clearly
if it is satisfactorily established that the interstate rates are reasonable, then the
intrastate rates representing charges for less service for substantially the same
facilities must necessarily be so. The lower appellate court based its affirmative
answer to this first premise upon negative evidence: "We must assume, in the
absence of all proof to the contrary, that the rates so established by the American Company and approved by the Federal Communications Commission are
just, fair and reasonable to the utilities as well as·to the public..••" 10 Appellant
failed to sustain the burden thus deposited with it of proving that the interstate
rates are unfair, and therefore it can be reasonably inferred that they are not.
existing rates of any public utility for any service are unjust, unreasonable, or in anywise in violation of any provision of law, the commission shall determine the just and
reasonable rates (including maximum or minimum rates) to be thereafter observed and
in force, and shall fix the same by order to be served upon the public utility, and
such rates shall constitute the legal rates of the public utility until changed as provided in this act." Pa. Pub. Laws (1937), p. 1053, § 309, Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp.

1939), tit. 66, § 1149.
8 For a discussion of the methods used by the courts in arriving at a proper valuation, see Beutel, "Valuation as a Requirement of Due Process of Law in Rate Cases,"
43 HARV. L. REv. 1249 (1930). In general, consult Kauper, "Wanted: A New Definition of the Rate Base," 37 M1cH. L. REv. 1209 (1939). Leading cases in this
field are: Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898); Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729 (1913); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 262 U. S. 276, 43 S. Ct. 544 (1923); McCardle v.
Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 S. Ct. 144 (1926). See also Haun, "Inconsistencies in Public Utility Depreciation," 38 M1cH. L. REv. 160 (1939), 38
M1cH. L. REv. 479 (1940).
9 Facilities may be described as identical for the reason that all calls, both interstate
and intrastate, while within Pennsylvania go over the same lines. E.g., a Harrisburg to
Philadelphia call (intrastate) uses exactly the same facilities as a Harrisburg to Camden
call (interstate).
1
From the opinion of the superior court, 135 Pa. Super. 218 at 235. The court's
conclusion is bolstered by positive testimony introduced to the effect that since the
establishment of the interstate rates, effective February 15, 1937, the American Company has continued to pay dividends of nine per cent per annum on its common stock.
That the higher intrastate rates under attack may themselves have been reasonable per
se is admitted by counsel for respondent in the brief for Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission at page 10: "The term 'unreasonable' as used to describe the discrimination
is not to be confused with the unreasonableness of a rate per se. A rate may not be
excessive in itself and yet may be oppressive or discriminatory in fact. In discussing
discrimination in rates the relationship of rates is involved-not their reasonableness."
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Hence one must conclude that the commission's order was not arbitrary.11 It
should be clearly understood, however, that this extrinsic rule of comparison for
adoption of intrastate utility rates arises out of a case wherein interstate and
intrastate facilities are identical, and would be decidedly unsound were this not
true. The doctrine of this case must be limited, then, to cases involving precisely similar facts.12

11 Appellant's final contention that the order is a regulation of interstate rates
and imposes a direct burden upon interstate commerce has no foundation, and is unworthy of comment. The following cases uphold the power of a state to decide what
constitutes unreasonable discrimination with respect to intrastate commerce: Portland
Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 229 U. S. 397, 33 S. Ct. 820
(1913) (street railways); Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 289
U. S. 287, 53 S. Ct. 637 (1933) (gas); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 294 U. S. 63, 55 S. Ct. 316 (1935) (gas).
12 One such case is at present pending before the Michigan Supreme Court.
Under date of June 27, 1938, the Michigan Public Utilities Commission issued an
order similar to that upheld in the principal case reducing intrastate long-distance
rates of the Michigan Bell Telephone Company to conform to interstate rates. The
Telephone Company has obtained a temporary injunction permitting it to charge its
present higher rates until the order has been tested upon appeal.

